Pits have generally been treated as accountable units that are intact if merely present and they are excluded from the more demanding nondestructive assay requirements. As pits begin to flow into disposition streams, there may be more incentive to measure the masses of their fissile components for accountability purposes. This Department of Energy OSS Lifecycle Project has explored some ways in which such measurements may be done successfully.
OVERVIEW
The Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) Lifecycle was a study of performing accountability quality nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements on pits. Both shuffler and gamma-ray spectroscopy technologies were considered but this report describes the shuffler portion only. The immediate goal was to measure the delayed neutron count rates from assorted pits and match them with calculated rates. This would establish the important capability of calculating count rates for any pit design and provide a way around the need for physical calibration standards.
Shufflers assay fissile materials by inducing fissions with neutrons from a 252 Cf source and counting delayed neutrons. The prompt fission neutrons cannot be counted because the intense 252 Cf is still in the assay chamber, but after a few seconds of irradiation the source is rapidly withdrawn and the delayed neutrons can be counted above a small background rate. This irradiation and counting process can be repeated by shuffling the 252 Cf source in and out of the assay chamber as many times as needed to reach a desired precision of the delayed neutron count. Figure 1 summarizes these steps.
Pits have many features that are favorable to performing excellent accountability measurements, but there are also complications from possible mixtures of uranium and plutonium and nonfissile materials (matrices). Calculating delayed neutron count rates is also complicated by the vertical scanning of the 252 Cf source within the assay chamber during irradiations, giving the neutron flux a time dependence. These complications have been overcome and count rates have been successfully calculated for pits and other objects with fissile materials. The calculations are as accurate as the measured count rates. 
Fig. 1. The 252 Cf source alternates between the upper storage block and the lower assay chamber with the object to be assayed (yellow). It is stored during the background count (a) and again stored after the irradiation (b) so that delayed neutrons can be counted (c) without the intense source present. Steps (b) and (c) can be repeated many times until the desired precision in the count is reached. This "shuffling" of the source between two positions gives rise to the name of the instrument. For this illustration the source should be scanning along the side of the object during the irradiation (b) to give a more uniform irradiation throughout the object's volume. Detector tubes are not shown, but they surround the object to record the delayed neutrons in (c).
This report will first consider the simplest case of a single fissile element and a stationary 252 Cf source. This is the easiest case to calculate, but not the best way to perform an assay for any but very small objects. But considering this case provides a theoretical basis that will easily be extended to the more important situation when the 252 Cf source performs scans during the irradiations. The calculations are more complex in the scanning case, but easily managed by computers (Appendix A). Finally, the calculations are extended to pits with one or more fissile elements present. A comparison is made between calculated and measured count rates for several pits.
STATIONARY 252 CF SOURCE AND A SINGLE FISSILE ELEMENT
This section assumes that an object (such as a pit) has only a single fissile element and that the 252 Cf source of neutrons is stationary during the irradiations. The expression for the number of delayed neutrons N dn produced because of a constant irradiation during a finite time by a neutron source is N dn = Y p fission υ β T i = f β T i ,
3 where Y = neutron emission rate of the 252 Cf source, p fission = probability of a 252 Cf neutron inducing a fission, υ = average number of fission neutrons produced per fission, f = production rate of fission neutrons during the irradiation, = Y υ p fission , β = the fraction of the fission neutrons that are delayed, = sum of six individual β j for six precursor groups of fission products, T i = total irradiation irradiation by the 252 Cf source, = n t i , n = number of shuffles of the 252 Cf source into and out of the assay chamber, and t i = irradiation time during one shuffle.
The fission rate caused by neutrons from the 252 Cf source during the irradiation is Y p fission . Any secondary fissions, or multiplication events, are included in p fission . The average number of fission neutrons produced per second is Y υ p fission and the average number of delayed neutrons produced per second is Y υ p fission β.
For a shuffler with a detection efficiency for delayed neutrons of ε, the number of counts is not simply ε N dn because delayed neutrons cannot be counted while the 252 Cf source is irradiating the material. The source is "shuffled" in and out of the assay chamber on a regular cycle and delayed neutrons are counted only when the source is out (and prompt fission neutrons are gone). Therefore, only a fraction, f countable , of the delayed neutrons produced are countable. The total irradiation time T i is a sum of n shorter times, t i . This n is the number of shuffles used for the assay. The count D of delayed neutrons is the sum of n separate counts, one after each irradiation. D = N dn ε f countable (2) and the average count rate is
where T c is (n t c ) and t c is the count time during one shuffle. The average count rate is correlated with fissile mass to provide the calibration. While Eqs.
(1)-(3) provide a simple introduction to the shuffler theory, the need for f countable makes them inapplicable. To find f countable requires first calculating D, but if D is known then f countable isn't needed. So Eqs. (1)-(3) were developed here only help introduce the fundamental ideas and variables.
To get an accurate D without the need for the countable fraction, a detailed mathematical description of the four steps in a shuffler must be used. These are (a) the movement of the source into the assay chamber, (b) irradiation of the fissile material by the source's neutrons, (c) removal of the source back into the storage block, and (d) counting delayed neutrons. Such a mathematical description is developed in Ref. 1 . Equation (17) of that report is repeated here as Eq. (4) . It uses the six groups of precursor fission products that release delayed neutrons, indexed by j. Each group has its own decay constant λ j and delayed neutron fraction β j . While not as intuitively clear as Eq. (2), this expression has the countable fraction concept already included. A fundamental assumption in this model with important consequences is that p fission and therefore f are constants; in other words, the 252 Cf source is stationary during irradiations.
where t i = the irradiation time during one shuffle, t r = the time used to remove the 252 Cf source, = the time between the end of the irradiation and the start of the counting, t c = the count time during one shuffle, τ = the total time for one shuffle, and = t i + t r + t c + t f .
If you wish to know the countable fraction as an after thought, it can be found from this expression.
Equations (1) and (4) provide D and N dn . The fraction is generally between 0.15 and 0.25, so about 20% of all delayed neutrons produced are counted in practice. The others are emitted when the much stronger 252 Cf source is present. The detection efficiency of a neutron counter is usually measured with a small 252 Cf source because it simulates fission neutrons from plutonium, but this is inaccurate for a shuffler where delayed neutrons have a lower average energy. If the measurement efficiency with a 252 Cf source is 18%, the efficiency for delayed neutrons will be about 25%. The efficiency can be either calculated (with the Monte Carlo computer code MCNP) or measured with an AmLi neutron source. The energy spectrum of neutrons from an AmLi source is very similar to that of delayed neutrons, but the moderating effects of matrix materials are not included. The best way in general to get the efficiency may be through Monte Carlo calculation with an accurate shuffler model. Equation (4) was checked for accuracy with measurements on U 3 O 8 standards at the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) building. The calculations were in excellent agreement with the measurements. Details about this check are described in a later section ("Monte Carlo Calculations") where they are combined with measurements using a scanning 252 Cf source. So next Eq. (4) will be extended to cases when f is not a constant during the irradiation.
SCANNING

CF SOURCE AND A SINGLE FISSILE ELEMENT
When the object being assayed occupies a "large" volume (dimensions at least as large as the distance to the 252 Cf source), the 252 Cf source is scanned across or along the object in a manner to produce a nearly uniform distribution of delayed neutron precursors at the end of the irradiation. For example, the shuffler for 55-gallon drums scans the 252 Cf source vertically along side the drum while the drum rotates. There are three 1-s pauses at the top of the scan (near the top of the drum) and two 1.5-s pauses at the bottom; the speed of the source between these extreme positions is about 21 inches/s. An irradiation takes about 11.65 s, at the end of which there will be a distribution of delayed neutron precursors proportional to the distribution of 235 U. It might seem simpler to place a stationary 252 Cf source further from the object and let the geometry ensure a uniform irradiation across the object. But only a very small fraction of the neutrons from the 252 Cf would reach the object and the intensity of the source would have to be very large. Smaller sources require less shielding and are less expensive, so it is more practical to keep the source close to the objects being measured and scan during irradiations.
During an irradiation with scanning, the fission probability f is clearly not constant and Eqs. (1) and (4) do not apply. However, Eq. (4) can be modified easily to describe this new case, once it is understood how Eq. (4) was derived. The fundamental equation is for the rate at which the populations in each of the six groups of precursors change during an irradiation.
The first term on the right is the rate at which precursors are created; the second term is the rate at which precursors decay (and release delayed neutrons). If the fission neutron production rate f(t) is constant, the solution to Eq. (6) after an irradiation time t i is an exponential that approaches a saturation value.
So Eq. (4) can also be rewritten in terms of the number of precursors present after an irradiation time t i .
But Eq. (8) is true whether f is constant or not. It only matters that the precursor population at the end of the irradiation is known. This is the key to finding D when f(t) varies. The countable fraction and the effects of multiple shuffles are still built into Eq. (8) as before when the source was stationary.
We still need to solve Eq. (6) with a time-dependent fission rate for P j (t i ) to use in Eq. (8). The only practical technique is a numerical solution. It has the generality to handle any scanning protocol because f(t) is expressed as a table of numerical values at different times. The initial populations are all zero at the start of the first irradiation. Approximate values for P are then generated by numerical integration for increasingly later times until t i is reached.
Time steps ∆t of 0.1 s have worked very well in Eq. (9). The numerical integration was also done with the more sophisticated fourth-order Runge-Kutta algorithm with no difference in the result. The solution is smoothly changing with time, so the power of the Runge-Kutta method is not needed. The simpler approach in Eq. (9) was used in the calculations noted in the rest of this report. The key here is to know f(t) and a two-step process is needed to find its values. The Monte Carlo code MCNP is used to generate f (actually the closely related p fission ) at different stationary positions of the 252 Cf source. The positions at different times are then calculated and values of f are interpolated for each time. An EXCEL spreadsheet with Visual Basic macros performs the numerical integration and other calculations (Appendix A).
Equations (8) and (9) were checked using measurements and calculations for standard unclassified materials. These checks will be described in the next section.
THE MONTE CARLO CALCULATIONS
The Shuffler Model. The Monte Carlo model for the MCNP code was carefully constructed from as-built drawings of the shufflers at LANL's CMR and the plutonium research building at TA-55 that were used to take the measurements on pits and other items. The actual shufflers used are owned and operated by group NMT-4 and all measurements were in cooperation with members of that group (especially with Faye Hsue and Jon Hurd). A photograph of a shuffler identical to those used is in The correctness of the MCNP calculations and then the calculated count rates were checked with a series of increasingly difficult tests. The following subsections give the details.
Detection Efficiency Check. The count rate from a small encapsulated 252 Cf source in the center of the assay chamber was used as a check on the model's accuracy. Measurements with three such sources, corrected for the small dead time losses (≈ 0.5%) in the count rates, gave a detection efficiency of (18 ± 1)%.
However, the high voltage used in the measurements was the usual 1680 V (to avoid interference from very intense gamma rays). We know this means that the count rate is about 1% lower than it would be at a somewhat higher voltage where pulses from the detectors are more completely collected. So the corrected measured count rate to be compared to the MCNP calculated efficiency is (19 ± 1)%. The MCNP calculation gave (19.8 ± 0.1)%, which is within 1σ of the measured value and the model of the shuffler body is quite accurate in this simple test.
The same MCNP model was used to calculate the detection efficiency for delayed neutrons with their lower average energy. The energy spectrum is slightly affected by the nature of the material where the delayed neutrons are "born," but for metals and oxides the effect is rather slight. The general MCNP result is that the detection efficiency for delayed neutrons is very close to 25%, so the shuffler's actual efficiency at 1680 V is calculated to be about 24%.
An excellent simulation of delayed neutrons is produced by AmLi sources where neutrons are produced through (α,n) reactions. The LANL AmLi source C-285 was used in a shuffler to estimate the detection. The emission rate of C-285 is estimated to be 4.01x10 5 n/s and a count rate of 9358 ± 10 counts/s, so the measured detection efficiency is about 23.3%. Given the large uncertainty of the neutron yield from the AmLi source, this is in very good agreement with the calculation.
Fig. 2. This is a photograph of a shuffler identical to the one used in the measurements discussed in this report. At the time of this photograph the shuffler was still in the NIS-5 testing room; it has since been installed in a DOE facility. During this fabrication and testing phase, the shuffler is on a one-foot-high platform to give space for a detector bank and rotation motor below the assay chamber. If the installation includes a pit in the floor, the bottom of the doors is flush with the floor. The person is in front of the doors, which swing outward to open.
The Fission Probability Profile. The accuracies of Eqs. (4), (8), and (9) for the count of delayed neutrons were checked by measuring unclassified certified standards in the CMR shuffler. Both stationary and scanning source protocols were used. Equation (4) assumes that the fission rate f is constant for all irradiations. This is closely achieved with a real shuffler by rapidly moving the 252 Cf source to a fixed location, leaving it there for a time t i, and rapidly returning the source to its storage block. There is some irradiation during the rapid movements, but they are of short duration (a fraction of a second) and have no noticeable effect. A series of such measurements, from using different 252 Cf positions, generates a profile of the fission probability. (These will later be used in creating a table of values for f(t) when scanning is considered.) Equation (4) is checked by using these measurements singly and Eqs. (8) and (9) are checked by using them together.
The CMR shuffler was used with a can of U 3 O 8 (94% enrichment) containing 125 g of 235 U. This is one can in a set of certified standards. The powder's density has a secondary, but not insignificant, effect on the count rate, so the usual handling procedure for this shuffler was followed: the can was neither shaken nor tamped; the contents settle with shelf time and this "natural" density was left undisturbed. For MCNP purposes, the density was taken to be 2 g/cm 3 , as indicated by some previous measurements with a physical pendulum. 2 The can was on a 12.75-in.-high pedestal and the source was brought to various fixed positions to map the response (count rate) versus the distance moved. The fission probability was then calculated by solving Eq. (4) for f and then dividing f by Y υ . Figure 6 shows the fission probability profile for a yield of 2.813x10 8 n/s from the 252 Cf source. The measured values are in black with 1σ error bars. The calculated probabilities are in red with 1σ error bars showing only the statistical uncertainty generated by MCNP. These results confirm that Eq. (4) and the MCNP model can accurately reproduce the actual fission probability for a stationary 252 Cf source. The next step is to calculate count rates, but there is a complication that must be discussed first. 252 Cf Neutron Yield. The yield used in Fig. 7 was chosen to make the calculated and measured fission probabilities agree. It corresponds to a 252 Cf mass of 120.2 µg. The source fabricator (Frontier Technology) stated that the mass was 583.3 mg on April 4, 1994; the decay until the measurement date of December 8, 1999 would leave a mass of 131.8 µg. The fabricator assigns a 10% error to the declared mass and the 120.2 µg is within this range.
The calculated fission probabilities in Fig. 9 assumed that the density of the oxide was 2 g/cm 3 . This is a plausible value, but it could be as low as 1.5 or as high as 3 g/cm 3 , depending on handling. Some exploration of the impact density on count rate, from using this calculational method, shows that a density of 3 g/cm 3 gives count rates lower by about 8%. So if the density is higher than 2 g/cm 3 , the 252 Cf mass used in Fig. 9 would be lower than 120.2 µg. The best way to resolve this uncertainty is to measure uranium metal where there is no uncertainty in the density. The best intentions and attempts to measure a set of standard uranium disks have been thwarted for several months by various circumstances. But we still intend to measure them and this report will be revised afterwards. The measured rates were all corrected for the decay of the 252 Cf source back to a date when the 252 Cf mass was presumed to be 491 µg, based on the fabricator's information (with a stated uncertainty of 10%). The practical calibration based on measured rates does not require knowing the 252 Cf mass at all, only that it does not change (beyond the well-understood decay that is easily corrected).
The set of calculated rates uses a specific 252 Cf yield, so a best estimate of the yield was found by fitting the calculated rates to the measured rates. This gave a 252 Cf mass of almost exactly 400 µg on the shuffler's reference date where the fabricator's value would be 491 µg. This is 81.5% of the fabricator's value. This is the only "free" parameter in the comparison of measured and calculated rates. There is an overall bias somewhere, either in the calculations or in the source fabricator's mass estimate. There is not enough information known at this time to state with certainty where the problem lies, but our confidence in the calculations is quite high because they have repeatedly reproduced measured profiles and count rates.
The comparison of the measured and calculated count rates is shown in Figs. 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the complete range of 235 U masses while Fig. 8 zooms in on the masses below 1000 g that are difficult to see in Fig. 7 .
The calculated curve clearly matches the measured curve extremely closely. A seemingly aberrant measured point is at 2200 g. It may have had a different shape or matrix materials, or the declared mass may be in error. For whatever reason, it is not aligned with the other measured points and should probably be dropped from the calibration curve. This and the other checks demonstrate that the calculated count rates are accurate, once the yield of the 252 Cf source is determined. After a brief extension to multiple fissile materials, the calculational method will be applied to pits.
MULTIPLE FISSILE ELEMENTS
If an object has more than one fissile element, each element can be treated individually on the assumption that interactions among the elements are too weak to be important. This has been shown to be the case for cans of mixed oxides (U 3 O 8 and PuO 2 ) (Ref. 2, page 19) . However, the Monte Carlo calculation includes interactions between elements, so fission probabilities include any in 235 U produced by neutrons from 239 Pu and vice versa. The Monte Carlo calculations for such a case generate a fission probability p fission for each element and a detection efficiency ε for delayed neutrons from each element. Equations (8) and (9) then generate counts from all elements that are added to give the measured count.
These steps are no more work than is needed for single fissile elements because one MCNP calculation will give the fission probability for all the fissile elements at once. The numerical calculation of the separate count rates can be done by a single spreadsheet to give the individual and total count rates.
EXPERIENCE WITH PITS
The success in calculating count rates for U 3 O 8 gives the confidence needed to proceed to measurements and calculations for pits, which is the real goal of this Lifecycle. There are many designs of pits that have different types and amounts of fissile materials along with different geometries and matrix materials. Measurements were done on five widely different pit designs. The calculation for each type used a generic geometric description of that type but with declared fissile masses and isotopics.
The ratios of the calculated and measured count rates are given in Table I . When a pit was measured more than once the average count rate was used. Averages were also taken when more than one pit of the same type was measured. Included in this table are pits with plutonium only and others with both plutonium and uranium. The same 252 Cf neutron yield that produced the U 3 O 8 calibration curve was used for these pits. (This is a further check on the calculational process. The two radically different objects lead to the same yield, as they should.) The calculated count rates are clearly very close to the measured rates. The U 3 O 8 measurements were done on the CMR shuffler while the pits were measured with the TA-55 shuffler. But these two shufflers had already been normalized to each other by using the U 3 O 8 standards so a single calibration curve could be used on both. Therefore, it is immaterial which shuffler was used for which measurements.
The uncertainties in the measured count rates were typically 1 or 2% and the uncertainties in the calculated rates are probably about the same, aside from the question of the neutron yield. If the yield is now considered known from the U 3 O 8 measurements to 1%, then a 1-σ uncertainty in a ratio is about 3%. Such an uncertainty includes four of the ratios in Table I and the fifth is within 2σ.
The ability to calculate count rates for pits accurately means that calibration standards are not needed. In fact, the count rate for pit E in Table I was calculated before the measurement just to demonstrate this fact. It happened that the two rates for this pit had the good fortune to differ by only 0.05%! And this pit had both 235 U and 239 Pu, making it not the simplest of cases. From this experience with pits, a simple correlation was uncovered that probably is not restricted to pits. The shuffler count rate is directly proportional to the "total" fissile mass present, where the total fissile mass is the 235 U mass plus about one-third of the 239 Pu mass. The one-third factor arises from the smaller production of delayed neutrons by 239 Pu compared to 235 U. That ratio is 0.386 rather than 0.333, but there are also slight differences in fission cross sections to include. 
The value of k for pits will not be given here and the factor of 1/3 can probably be improved slightly. Such a relationship accurately describes the count rates experienced so far, but an even wider range of experience should be used to more fully test Eq. (10). In there is any doubt about the validity of Eq. (10), the more exacting calculational method should be used.
INTEGRATED PASSIVE AND ACTIVE NEUTRON PIT MEASUREMENTS
The plutonium in a pit can be measured with a passive neutron counter using multiplicity analysis. The results from a multiplicity counter can reveal the following information.
• 240 Pu effective mass, which along with Pu isotopics yields the Pu mass.
• The neutron multiplication, which depends on the Pu mass, the Pu isotopics, and the mass of any 235 U that may be present.
• The (α,n) emission rate, which depends on the amount of impurities present with low atomic weight (e.g., Li, Be, B, F, O). Materials attempting to masquerade as plutonium are revealed by these results. Materials that do not fission spontaneously will not generate neutrons. If 252 Cf or some other material that does have spontaneous fission is substituted for plutonium, the multiplicity distribution of neutrons will be wrong and the (α,n) emission rate may give an impossible value (e.g., negative). An (α,n) neutron source will not have the correct multiplicity distribution and will have a very high (α,n) emission rate.
If a pit has no uranium, the multiplicity counter gives the plutonium content and the assay for that pit is finished. If there is uranium present, the multiplicity still gives the plutonium content and a shuffler is needed to find the uranium mass.
A shuffler's fissions are induced in both the uranium and plutonium, and neutrons from the two elements are indistinguishable. The measured neutron count rate has contributions from both elements plus a potential cross-talk term as neutrons from one element induce fissions in the other ("cross multiplication"). (11)
"U" and "Pu" in Eq. 11 stand for 235 U and 239 Pu, the fissile isotopes. "U-Pu" means a neutron from a fission in uranium causes another fission in plutonium. The high-energy fission neutrons can induce fissions in fertile isotopes, so uranium and plutonium might be more inclusive than just 235 U and 239 Pu in the cross-multiplication terms. From Eq. (14) we need to extract the uranium fission rate from which is a function of the 235 U mass.
The task is simplified in that all measurements and calculations have shown that the crosstalk terms are negligible. This is true even for cans of mixed oxides with the most intimate mixing of the two materials possible. The cross-multiplication terms in Eq. (11) 
To find the count rate from uranium, the count rate from plutonium must be calculated first. A multiplicity neutron counter and gamma-ray instrument provide the plutonium isotopic masses, with uncertainties. A correlation is needed between the 239 Pu mass and r Pu , and then the count rate from 235 U alone is known.
Measurements to establish the two functions f ) ( 235 U m and g(m Pu ) directly would have to be done under less than ideal conditions, if at all. To measure g(m Pu ) we can use pits with plutonium only, but these pits are unlikely to have the same plutonium shapes and masses found in pits with uranium also. Furthermore, the response from plutonium is different when uranium is present because of neutron shielding effects (this is not the same as cross multiplication). To measure f( U 235 m )we need to measure uranium alone, but that means disassembling pits. And again the shielding of neutrons from the uranium by the plutonium is missing.
Another measurement approach is to work with intact pits of uranium and plutonium. By working with enough pits of different designs the functions f and g could be deduced that give the best fit of Eq. (9) to the data. More likely, the functions would take on the form of tables with an entry for each pit design.
A more practical approach is to calculate the fission rates from the two isotopes and develop the functions or tables. As shown in previous sections, the calculated count rates are as accurate as the measured count rates. And they give count rates from 235 U and 239 Pu individually. Here is an example of this process, where we have used an unclassified shape that we created as a demonstration for this report. A solid cylinder of plutonium is inside a hollow cylinder of uranium. The length was chosen to be 10 cm and the radii were selected to give masses of 1 kg for both elements (with a density of 19 g/cm 3 for both). The two radii are 1.29343 and 1.83047 cm. The 239 Pu fraction is 94% and the uranium enrichment is 94%.
Monte Carlo calculations were done with the same shuffler on which the pit measurements were done. The fission probabilities for the two isotopes as a function of the 252 Cf height above the bottom of the assay chamber are given in Table II . A fission probability is the chance that a single 252 Cf neutron will induce a fission; this includes cross multiplication fissions, if they indeed occur. The probabilities are highest when the 252 Cf source is near the 12 in. height because it is then nearest the cylinder. 8.237x10 -4 The numerical process in Eqs. (8) and (9) uses these fission probabilities to calculate the delayed neutron count rates from uranium and plutonium individually. The results are 1193 counts/s from uranium and 420 counts/s from plutonium for a total of 1613 counts/s. The plutonium count rate is only 20% of the rate from uranium because (a) each fission of plutonium produces about 38% as many delayed neutrons as a fission of uranium, and (b) it is somewhat shielded from the neutrons by the uranium, making the fission rate lower. High-energy neutrons can penetrate through the uranium because the absorption probability is low, but this means there is also less chance of inducing fissions in the plutonium. Low-energy neutrons are more likely to induce fissions in the uranium and never reach the plutonium. Nevertheless, the plutonium contributes 17% of the total count rate and it would be obvious if the plutonium were missing.
To illustrate the determination of the 235 U mass, we start with the count rate from the entire cylinder. Assume that the measured count rate is 1640 ± 20 counts/s, a range which includes the calculated count rate of 1613 counts/s from the preceding paragraph. Assume that f and g are these linear functions for such a cylinder: g(m Pu ) = (0.447 counts/s/g-239 Pu) m Pu , with a 3% uncertainty on the parameter; f(m U ) = (1.269 counts/s/g-235 U) m U , with a 2% uncertainty assigned to this coefficient.
If a multiplicity counter gives the plutonium mass to be (1031 ± 23) g and the 239 Pu fraction is measured to be (93.2 ± 0.7)%, the 239 Pu mass to use with the g function is (961 ± 22) g. The expected count rate from the plutonium to use in Eq. (17) is (0.447± 0.013)(961 ± 22) = (430 ± 16) counts/s. We already know from the Monte Carlo calculations above that 420 counts/s is more accurate, but errors have been propagated and 430 is less than 1σ from 420.
Subtracting this plutonium rate from the total rate, the rate from the 235 U is (1640 ± 20) -(430 ± 16) = (1210 ± 26) counts/s. Using the f function, the 235 U mass is (1210 ± 26)/(1.269 ± 0.038) = (953 ± 28) g and the total uranium mass is (1014 ± 31) g. This result is 1.4% higher than the true value. The error propagation has led to a 3.1% uncertainty in the final uranium mass, so the error has not grown much beyond the uncertainties in the f and g function coefficients. (The uncertainties were propagated at each step. The result is slightly too small when done this way. The better final uncertainty is 3.3%, as will be explained below.)
This has been an artificial but illustrative example of determining the uranium mass from imperfect measurements. Equations (15) and (17) are the key relationships. A general expression for the uncertainty in the uranium mass depends on the form of the f(m U ) and g(m Pu ) expressions. If they are the simple linear functions used in the example, the uncertainty in the uranium mass can be easily worked out. The symbols "U" and "Pu" in these equations again stand for 235 U and 239 Pu. 
This is the expression that gave the 3.3% uncertainty for the cylinder example. 239 Pu mass. Otherwise, the count rate will change. The net effect is that the mass of the pit is smaller and a scale can easily detect the change.
ACCOUNTABILITY MEASUREMENTS ON PITS WITH A SHUFFLER AND A SCALE
If the measured and calculated count rates match, and the pit's mass is correct, the expected 235 U and 239 Pu masses must be present.
CONCLUSIONS
Delayed neutron rates from shuffler measurements of pits can be replicated through calculations with excellent accuracy. This means that calibration standards that are expensive or unavailable for a shuffler are not necessary. The calculations require a detailed, accurate MCNP model of the shuffler along with information about the geometry and mass of a pit.
There may be a simple way to relate fissile mass and count rates among different pit designs, even if they contain more than one fissile element. In the experience so far, the count rates are linearly proportional to the "total" fissile mass (the 235 U mass plus about 1/3 of the 239 Pu mass). Before taking this to be a universal result, an even larger variety of pit designs should be considered and measured.
A shuffler is usually designed to use the 252 Cf source neutrons in the most efficient manner by making the assay chamber fit snugly around the object. This reduces both the size and cost of the shuffler. In the measurements here, we have used existing large shufflers designed for 55-gallon drums on much smaller pits and cans. The results are still excellent. A smaller shuffler specially designed for pit measurements could give more precise measurements in less time because there would be less space around pits through which 252 Cf neutrons could travel without hitting a pit. A weaker 252 Cf source could be used and the shuffler would be smaller. For pits containing both plutonium and uranium, the masses of the individual elements can be deduced from passive and active neutron measurements along with isotopes from gamma-ray measurements. The successful application of multiplicity analysis for plutonium has been demonstrated with a large passive counter specially designed for multiplicity analysis. 3, 4 The shuffler for 55-gallon drums used here was not designed for multiplicity counting. The assay chamber is much larger than needed for the active measurement and has several defects for passive multiplicity counting. A shuffler designed around existing multiplicity counters for 30-gallon drums would meet all the conditions needed for the best active and passive neutron measurements.
APPENDIX A BRIEF GUIDE TO THE CALCULATION OF ABSOLUTE SHUFFLER COUNT RATES
The calculation of absolute shuffler count rates has been semi-automated with the help of some computer codes and commercial applications. An outline of the steps followed in a calculation is given in this appendix.
The numerical examples given below are for the standard, commercialized shufflers large enough to hold 55-gallon drums. For other shufflers the dimensions and measurement protocol will change, but the general procedure will be the same.
Step 1. The First MCNP Input File
The fission probability (per 252 Cf neutron) must be calculated for a stationary source at several different positions along the scanning path. (If scanning is not done, only the correct single position is needed.) For the 55-gallon drum shuffler, the 252 Cf source is moved 60 inches from the stored position and then scanned another 30 inches. So the distance varies from 60 to 90 inches.
MCNP fission probabilities have usually been calculated at these extreme positions and every 2 inches in between. The optimum number and spacing of these calculations have not been thoroughly explored, but for cans with less than 2 kg of U 3 O 8 it seems that fewer calculations that are 4 inches apart might be adequate. It appears that 2-inch spacing is always adequate, so to be conservatively safe it can always be used. There are then 16 MCNP runs to perform. The time used for a single calculation for a pit has been from 30 to 60 minutes on a modern PC (>200 MHz). It could be that 15 minutes would be enough for many purposes, so a single computer could do the 16 runs in 4 hours. Cf source at the 60-inch position. Remember that this is the distance the 252 Cf has moved to reach the top of the assay chamber. The height of the source above the floor of the assay chamber will be about 87.67 cm. The other 15 positions of the source will be calculated for you by a code described in step 2.
(d) Specify an appropriate run time or number of neutrons to be started. You will generally want an MCNP calculation to get better than 5% precision; 1% is even better. But sometimes compromises are necessary. Run times of 15 to 60 minutes have been adequate.
Step 2. All MCNP Input Files The additional 15 (or so) MCNP input files for all the other 252 Cf positions are generated automatically with an option of the EXCEL spreadsheet "CPS.xls". A portion of that spreadsheet is shown in Fig. A-1 . In the left-hand column the distances moved by the 252 Cf Fig. A-1 . This is a portion of the spreadsheet "CPS.xls" that performs several automated operations according to which of the three gray "buttons" is chosen with a mouse click.
source are specified (60, 62,…,90). The cell below 90 inches must be blank to indicate the end of the list. Edit this column in the usual way to use other distances, but always end with a blank cell. All distances are in inches. Make sure that the directory path points to the single MCNP file you created for the source at the initial distance (60 inch). The name of that file must be the first distance in the list with the extension ".txt" ("60.txt" in the example). Then click on the top button ("Write MCNP Input Files") and in a few seconds a "beep" will announce that all the other files have been written for the other distances. The spreadsheet will not appear different, but the directory should now show all these *.txt files. A Visual Basic program within EXCEL (as a macro) has done the actual work.
Step 3. MCNP Calculations.
Each of the MCNP input files needs to be run. "CPS.xls" generated a batch file that may help you do this.
Finding the results of each of these calculations buried within the output files is tedious, so "CPS.xls" will automatically read the files and extract the results and their uncertainties. Click on the button that says "Read MCNP Output Files." The data will go into columns 2 and 3 of the table shown in Fig. A-1 . The last column is a calculation based on columns 2 and 3 it is calculated automatically.
A graph is automatically made of the fission probabilities at the different heights. They should form a rather smooth curve. If they do not, see if there is a good reason or some mistake.
Step. 4. Count Rate Calculation.
Before calculating a count rate, check the delayed neutron parameters for the fissile material shown in the upper-left corner of the spreadsheet (Fig. A-2 ). These must be the correct ones for the material you are using. Below that box is another one with the parameters describing the measurement procedure (time of irradiation, etc.). Make sure these match the measurement conditions.
The calculation of the count rate is done by clicking on the last button with the label "CLICK: Calculate Delayed Neutron Count Rate." The complex numerical integration of Eq. (6) and the evaluation of Eq. (8) are done very rapidly to give the number of counts and the count rate in the red box near the button. Another Visual Basic macro within EXCEL has done all this work.
Summary of Codes Needed
• The LANL Monte Carlo code MCNP calculates the fission probabilities at specified positions of the 252 Cf source.
• An MCNP input file describing the shuffler with the object being assayed and the 252 Cf source at the first distance. The file name must be that distance with the extension ".txt" (e.g., "60.txt).
• The EXCEL spreadsheet "CPS.xls" has various parameters and performs several tasks for the user.
• MCNP input files for all the other 252 Cf distances are generated by "CPS.xls" by using the list of distances specified in the spreadsheet.
• MCNP output files for all the 252 Cf distances are generated by MCNP. For an input file named "60.txt" there will be an output file named "60.out," and so on.
• "CPS.xls" reads the MCNP output files and makes a plot of them.
• "CPS.xls" calculates the delayed neutron count rate from all the preceding information.
The spreadsheet can be renamed and stored as a record of the specific calculation. 
Mixtures of Fissile Materials
If two fissile materials, such as 235 U and 239 Pu, are both present, they both undergo fissions inside the shuffler and produce delayed neutrons. The simplest case is when they are separate from each other and represented by different MCNP cells. They then have separate material specifications. Then the MCNP input file must tally fissions in both cells. The EXCEL spreadsheet "CPS2.xls" is then used. It has the delayed neutron parameters for both isotopes and reads the MCNP output files for both tallies. The number of columns in Fig. A-1 are increased accordingly. Count rates from the individual isotopes are shown along with the total count rate.
The materials could be mixed together in the same MCNP cell, as with mixed oxides (MOX). "CPS.xls" is then used again, but the delayed neutron parameters (Fig. A-2, top) should be an appropriate average of the values of the two isotopes. The mixture of the materials specified within the input file can be used to form the average. The delayed neutron parameters for many isotopes are given in Ref. 1. If there are more than two fissile materials, the macro within "CPS2.xls" will have to be modified to read all the fission probabilities within each MCNP output file and then perform the analyses.
